Integration Indicators

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Introduction

Despite the integration (or lack of integration) of immigrants and immigrant minorities clearly represents a crucial reason of strength (or instability) for the receiving countries, the scientific research has not carried out so far enough efforts to survey these processes in a systematic way and to provide for cumulative and interrelated studies, which might support decision making with empirically reliable tools. The relation between policies and outcomes is very difficult to evaluate and still under-researched. When one tries to put together studies and researches dealing with immigrants integration, what emerges is more an interesting brilliant patchwork rather than a definite image of a patiently and coherently constructed puzzle. In this short review of the literature, we will try to make some first steps from the patchwork towards the puzzle, but we do not pretend to be able to fill up the gaps, neither to find the numerous missing links nor to construct a new consistent theoretical framework. This review is doomed to reflect the discontinuity and heterogeneity of the studies and researches on which is based, and the lack of consistent analyses on the relations between integration policies on the one hand, and outcome and integration indicators on the other hand.

In the first part of the paper, we shall start our review by analysing the concept of integration and by tracing back its origin and evolution. We will then suggest to single out three main dimensions of the concept, which correspond with the three goals[2] that integration policies should attempt to pursue, i.e. a) preservation and improvement of immigrants' (and nationals') *integrity*, i.e. of their life conditions; b) positive *interaction* among ethnic groups, and between ethnic groups and nationals (see Zincone 2000) and c) *positive impact* on the whole system. We will not deal here with a fourth possible dimension, i.e. d) the *positive impact on the sending countries*, even though this should be considered as a relevant aspect of what we could define as a 'transnational integration'. We will then present the main paths of research followed.

A relevant part of the studies concerning integration have been devoted to build typologies of integration models. As we shall see below, during the '90s, these models have entered into a phase of deep crisis. Due to the poor results of the main integration strategies, important reforms were introduced in many political systems. These reforms were often so little in tune with the frame of

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[2] In a policy brief, Michael Jandl (2006) identifies five goals of migration policies, that is a field which is broader than immigration: 1) labour market, integration and welfare goals in receiving countries, 2) development impact on sending countries, 3) human rights and refugee protection, 4) reduction of irregular migration and 5) public opinion and the promotion of an informed and rational public discussion.

the original model to suggest scholars to abandon the very idea of classifying national cases in the old categories. Anyway starting from the obsolete models will help us in understanding the main contradictions within the national models, remarkable differentiation at local level, reasons for change, common trends of evolution, and possible convergences. We conclude this part by proposing to abandon models and to come back to goals. We will also show that these goals have in some way been indicated also by International Law and EU legislation in particular, even tough some of EU the legal instruments provided appear quite 'watered', also according to Vitorino former EU Commissioner opinion. In order to evaluate if these goals are achieved at least to some extent, we need to have a coherent set of 'indicators' of integration. However the indicators singled out to date by the literature follow logics of classification which are different from the one we are suggesting. We will first present indicators according to the logics actually followed, and then try to translate them in the goals-oriented logic we are here proposing.
In the second part of the paper we shall focus more specifically on the indicators of integration. In the introduction of this second part, we will deal with issues of methodology and data collection. Then, the main types of indicators proposed by the literature will be reviewed and then 'reclassified' according to the three dimensions of integration listed above. The purpose is that of highlighting a set of tentative measures of integration, which might help in assessing to what extent policies come closer to the goals previously singled out. This set of indicators, while not exhaustive, might act, at least, as a benchmark to orientate policies aimed at answering at concrete integration gaps and failures.

1. Integration theories and models. A critique and a proposal

The concept of integration- the origin and the dimensions

Integration as a concept and a strategy was born from the ashes of the assimilation strategy. At the origin assimilation was a dominant term and theory. The notion of assimilation was introduced by the Chicago School in the 20s and dominated American sociological theories for decades. According to this theory, immigrants enter a process that starts with their arrival, passes through different phases of the 'migratory cycle', and ends in few generations, with their inevitable assimilation within the receiving society. In this sense assimilation would imply the giving up of immigrants culture and a complete adaptation to the host society culture.[3] Actually, until the '60s, the way of dealing with cultural differences was just to abolish them (Grillo 2004). This radical meaning of assimilation was and still is strongly criticized and the term is consequently unlikely to come back into political discourse. However some ingredients of the assimilationist recipe were never dismissed and have been more largely made use of in recent times. Furthermore, as we shall try to illustrate, in some areas assimilation (intended as "becoming similar and even equal") is a desirable goal, in so far as it increases immigrants' integrity and wellbeing.
Looking back to the past, assimilation, as a descriptive and prescriptive consolidated theory started to enter into crisis since the mid '60s, because it proved to be empirically false. Immigrants did not 'assimilate'. Even second and third generations were facing economic and social difficulties and endemic interethnic conflicts were still there. Adopting our parameters, we could say that nor the goal of integrity for communities of immigrant origins, neither the one of positive relations between

[3] Duncan's generational cycles (1933), for instance, theorizes a progressing three-generation-cycle. The straight line assimilation model (Warner and Srole 1945) conceives integration as a common, even perhaps not contemporaneous, evolvement of all groups in American society towards a universal American way of life. Park's race relations cycle model (1950) conceives integration as constituted by four phases: contact, competition, accommodation and assimilation.

immigrant and national groups were achieved by a sort of spontaneous process, implying the fading of cultural differences and group identities.
In the meantime, the concept of *integration* was gradually introduced in the US sociological studies and then in the political arena. At the beginning, it was adopted as a tool to contrast discrimination and racism. At that time *integration* had US black minorities as main target (Favell 2001). The concept consequently still included a component of *assimilation*, in its positive meaning, i.e. becoming similar, becoming equal as far as rights and opportunities were concerned, on the one hand, and sharing similar civic values, on the other. That is why, even now, according to many scholars, assimilation and integration are not conceived as contrasting concepts. In Dubet's theory (1989), for instance, assimilation is not regarded as a model of incorporation contrasting with integration, but as an aspect of the integration process, i.e. cultural transformation and mutual adaptation (Solivetti 2004), and it is not banned as undesirable. In the economic area, assimilation as equal opportunity between workers of national origins, on the one hand, and immigrants and immigrant minorities, on the other, is commonly surveyed and considered as a desirable goal by scholars. In particular, this is the case as far as stability of the job, income, vertical and horizontal non segregation, upwards mobility and careers are concerned (Chiswick 1991; Borjas 1995; Venturini 2004).
On the other hand, because of the supposed proximity between the concepts of integration and cultural assimilation in its negative meaning (i.e., forced abolition of cultural differences), also the concept of integration has been put under criticism. More neutral terms such as inclusion and incorporation have been preferred. Alternatively, integration has been explicitly presented as the opposite of assimilation, the last conceived as abolition of differences and one-way adaptation.
Integration has been, accordingly, defined as a two-ways process of mutual adaptation involving both new immigrant groups and national ones (Council of Europe 1995; 2000; see also the EU documents mentioned below). In fact, as it has been argued (Joppke 2006, 4), the effort of adaptation cannot be symmetrical, i.e. equally shared between national majorities and new minorities, being obviously more onerously located on new comers shoulders. However, nationals cannot be completely exempted from this process of adaptation.

Integration theories

We can classify integration theories in 1) theories oriented at *defining and analysing the process in general;* 2) theories aimed at *singling out outcomes*; 3) theories oriented at building *models*. There is obviously no clear cut between these categories, but this classification can help us to underline links with the three dimensions and goals we have proposed above, to integrate them by specifying perspectives and areas, to trace guidelines for possible integration indicators.

1) *Process in general*. Analysing the process implies making use of integration as a well established sociological concept, that refers to the relation among the various parts of a social system. If a system is integrated, its parts must be connected by strong and stable relations. An "integrated" part of a system is an old or a new part connected by positive relations to the others and to the whole. The arrival of immigrants opens a process of integration since the new element modifies previous relations and requires both the reform of old relations and the formation of new ones. Successful or unsuccessful integration implies actors more or less willing to build stable, strong and positive relations.
Within this analytical framework, Lockwood (1964) has suggested to distinguish the notion of **social integration** from the notion of **systemic integration.**[4] Social integration is the result of

[4] Following Lockwood's sociological theory, system integration is the functioning of coordinating and "integrating" institutions and organizations within a social system. It is a top-down functioning, via the state, the legal system and markets, independent from and often against goals and interests of the individuals.

actions, it is due to conscious interaction and cooperation between new actors and actors of national origins. Systemic integration is due to the whole system, i.e. to its institutions, to the legal system, the market, the industrial relations and other aspects of the system. Let us make an example to clarify this distinction referring to the Unions. The systemic dimension concerns the strength of unions and the kind of industrial relations. The social dimension concerns the attitudes of unions towards immigrant workers, the level of immigrants' incorporation within the unions, their rate of unionization as well as the positions attained by immigrants in the internal unions' organisation. It has been recently observed that systemic integration, the structural features of the receiving country can play a role even more crucial than specific integration policies addressed to immigrants (Koopmans 2002; Boecker and Thraenhardt 2003; Joppke 2006). We will come back to this very useful remarks when questioning the actual performances of the different models of integrations.

2) *Outcomes*. A second relevant way of looking at integration is to focus on the *outcomes*, i.e. on the consequences of integration processes *for the immigrants* and *for the system*. Taking the moves from an innovative article (Esser 2004), the EFMS-INTPOL (2005) team has proposed to distinguish between 1) **social integration**, i.e. "inclusion into the core institutions of the receiving country"; 2) **social structure integration**, i.e. "decrease or absence of ethnic stratification", of inequalities attributable to ethnic belongings; 3) **societal integration**, i.e. "absence of immigration related severe group conflict and as cohesion among major social groupings".
Point 2, i.e. inclusion and decrease of ethnic stratification are so strongly interrelated to be virtually coincide. On the other hand, if we confront the EFMS team classification with our proposal we can consider point 2 (decrease of ethnic stratification) as a case of non negative impact of immigrants on the whole system, by contrast new inequalities and the formation of marginalized strata of immigrant origins could negatively affect the whole system. As a consequence, the general structure of inequality could look worsened. Lack of inclusion of immigrant minorities, the presence of conflicts deriving from this failure and the possible repressive measures introduced to control interethnic conflicts can change the profile of the whole system. These dimensions can be translated in our – easier to understand – classification: integrity (inclusion in the core institutions of the receiving country and absence of ethnic stratification); positive interaction (absence of severe group conflict and cohesion among major social groupings), positive impact on the system (system integration).
Researchers have usually devoted particular attention to the integrity dimension i.e. to rights, chances, and to a lesser but still sizeable extent to the relational dimension, i.e. to social relations and identities. In these perspectives they have tried to single out structures, processes, attitudes, areas where integration can (not) take place.
Esser (2001), for instance, singles out four main loci of social integration. 1) **Acculturation** (or socialization), i.e. the transmission and the acquisition of knowledge and competences by an individual in order to successfully interact in the host society. 2) **Placement**, i.e. the occupation of relevant positions in the society (in the economic system for instance). 3) **Interaction**, i.e. the establishing of mutual relations and networks among actors. 4) **Identification**, i.e. the attitude of an actor or an individual to consider him/herself as part of the collective body[5]. Esser's classification suggests to look not only to *rights but also to actual conditions, on the one hand, and to focus on perceptions and identities, as well*. For instance, despite naturalization criteria and procedures can be equally easy to comply with rates of naturalization can vary according to different attitudes towards naturalization. And even if they are equally high among communities of different origins, the acceptance of the new communities of citizens by the national majority can more or less favourable and the identification of the new minorities with the country where they live and they are citizens of can vary and be low as well. Recent researches in Switzerland (Killias 2005) have showed a persisting prevailing identification with minorities than with the national community,

[5] The application of these four dimensions of social integration produced the distinction between **cultural**, **structural**, **interactive** and **identificational** integration (Heckmann and Schnapper 2003).

even among second and third generation citizens of immigrant origins (Bolzman and Fibbi 1991; Flückiger and Ramirez 2001).
The focus is mainly on immigrants rights and opportunities in Entzinger (2000). He distinguishes three spheres of the integration process: 1) **legal-political**, 2) **cultural** and 3) **socio-economic**. The first sphere refers to the legal status of migrants in the receiving country and their inclusion into citizenship rights. However, a secure legal status and access to social and even political rights does not prevent migrants from been marginalized under a cultural and socioeconomic point of view. This classification confirms the necessity of *distinguishing between policies and rights, on the one hand, and actual opportunities and conditions, on the other.* Not only at material needs can be more or less met but also immaterial demands. The second sphere, the cultural one, in fact, includes, for instance, the accommodation of new minorities, of their cultural needs in social services, in the legal and judicial systems, as well as in the field of education and cultural expression. The third sphere, the socio-economic one, refers to actual involvement of migrants in the market - i.e. participation in the labour market as employed (wages, employment), or self employed, their participation in the markets of capitals, goods and services, as well as their integration through state programs and social benefit.
Summing up this a-systematic analysis of the literature suggest that **our three goals** should be analyzed taking into account **three perspectives:** 1) **rights and policies**, 2) **actual opportunities and conditions**, 3) **perceptions and identities.** These three perspectives can be applied to **three areas** :1) the **public and civic**, 2) the **cultural and religious**, 3) the **economic one**.
For instance, as far as positive v. negative interaction in the economic area is concerned, we could have competition or complementarity between national and immigrant labour force. Complementarity in the labour market as coming out from empirical research, would not prevent negative perceptions, fears of displacement and competition as surveyed by opinion polls. This sort of three-level systematic approach (goals, perspectives, areas) has not been followed to date because it would imply huge comparative research investments. As a consequence also integration models have not taken into consideration important aspects of integration strategies and outcomes.

3) *Integration models*[6]. The main classifications of integration models have focused only on one or few of the aspects highlighted above (Entzinger 2000): for instance, the distinction between *guest worker model* (Castles 1984) and *permanent immigration model* focuses both on the legal political and the socio-economic spheres – on the (lack of) stability of residency legal status , on the (difficult) access to nationality and on the (in)stable inclusion in the labour market. The identification of republican v. ethnic models (Brubaker 1992), is centred on legal political sphere, on citizenship and nationality: *jus soli* v. *jus sanguinis*. The distinction between *ethnic minorities model* (Rex 1991; Hollifield 1997) and *assimilation model* focuses more on the cultural sphere – preservation of cultural identities or their banning from public arena. Other scholars have developed typologies of integration models based on a plurality of dimensions, in order to not oversimplify the complex dynamics of immigrant integration (Zincone 1992; Castles 1995; Wihtol de Wenden & De Tinguy 1995; Bryant 1997; Zolberg 1997; Hollifield 1997, Koopmans et al. 2002). But none was equipped with the set of dimensions, perspectives and areas we are suggesting here.
On the other hand, no model can adequately grasp the complexity of evolving national policies. As Entzinger observes, models always tend to oversimplify reality because "forcing countries into the straightjacket of a model does insufficient justice to changes that occur over the years and to differences in viewpoints that exist within each of the countries" (Entzinger 2000, 7). And Freeman notices that "the notion of national models …lends too much dignity to the patchwork of

[6] For *models*, we intend here "ideal-types" in a Weberian sense. We are fully aware that, in public debate, that have become more and more confronting ideologies, prescribing different ways to integrate immigrants. However, here we focus on that scientific literature that has attempted to describe in a – more or less successful – neutral way the main features and characteristics distinguishing each model.

institutions, laws, and practices that constitute incorporation frameworks in the West countries" (Freeman 2003, 3).

Carrera argues that "traditional models of integration no longer exist: Societies and their public philosophies towards immigrants and their integration are continuously changing" because of "evolving contemporary realities, political and economic priorities, and dramatic events" (2006, 2) while Joppke maintains that "the notion of 'national models' no longer makes sense, if it ever did" (2006, 1). We only partially share these opinions. Original models as descriptive instruments are obsolete but as heuristic tools they can still spring some suggestions.

Let us proceed by presenting the results of a vast literature in a nutshell. Two are the main integration models more often singled out, the **assimilationist** and the **multicultural** one. These have been then specified into subtypes, that we will try to polish and present in our own version below.

As an ideal type, the **assimilationist** model is based on the institutional focus on the individual as such and on the recognition of individual rights in a universalistic way, as well as on the exclusion of linguistic and religious identities from the public sphere. At least two variants of this model can be pointed out: the *state oriented assimilationist* model and the *societal and market oriented* one.

France is usually described as a prototype of the state-oriented model, since integration policies have been traditionally aimed at reaching cultural homogeneity and individual inclusion through a relatively easy access to nationality, and the consequent recognition of citizens rights, political rights above all, as well as duties (including military service). According to the *Haut Conseil à l'intégration* (1993), the French conception of integration had to conform to a logic of equality and not to a logic of minority groups' rights. It is founded on the "equality of individuals before the law, whatever their origins, their race, their religion" (Banton 2001). Integrity is assured tanks to a system of rights concerning all the areas but the cultural one. Interaction is favoured by the sharing of a common language, by common access to welfare and public education, even though discrimination in practice occurs and non citizens are also legally prevented from being hired in certain jobs. Positive impact concerns meanly the institutional sphere, the dominant role of the state towards civil society.

The societal and market oriented assimilationist model can be identified with the US case. Here the crucial mechanism of integration is not the state but the market. Affirmative action policies, that are objectively in contrast with a pure assimilationist model, are essentially aimed at fostering equal opportunities in access to jobs and education, in order to counterbalance actual barriers due to discrimination (Piccone Stella 2003). In the cultural domain, the neutral attitude of the state allows different cultures to co-exist in society, but no public support is provided to minority cultures, since communities are supposed to mix up in the 'melting pot'. However, the myth of the melting pot, hides - according to some authors (Castles 1995)- a request to conform with the majority culture, from which the use of the label 'assimilationist' assigned to this model originates. Integrity is assured by easy access to nationality and to jobs also for non citizens. Preservation of cultural identity is discouraged. Segregation and desegregation policies have mainly if not exclusively concerned the black minorities. As a country of immigration the US, in their political culture, postulate a positive impact on the whole system. However the US in their past and in their present have introduced measures to control and select immigration - such as the 1882 Chinese Exclusion Act, the 1907 Gentlemen Agreement concerning migration from Japan, the 1924 National Origin Act aimed at curbing Southern and Eastern European immigration.

Multiculturalism as an ideal type is a policy model based on the recognition of groups' right to difference. The more complete form of recognition of groups' rights would be the creation of parallel legal systems. However, recognition in Europe has concretely assumed more moderate forms, as pointed out in the two main sub-types that we can identify surveying the literature, i.e. *liberal multiculturalism* and *functionalist multiculturalism*. Whereas the main assimilationist models can be considered as different versions of the same model, the two main multicultural models are one the opposite of the other.

The so-called *liberal* sub-model of multiculturalism used to be considered as specific of United Kingdom, Scandinavian countries and of a second phase of Dutch policies. In this model, the ideal purpose of public policy is "to enable members of ethnic minorities to participate freely and fully in the economic, social and public life of the nation, with all the benefits and responsibilities which that entails, while still being able to maintain their own culture, traditions, language and values" (Banton 2001). However, in-depth comparison between the Netherlands and Great Britain integration policies pointed out at least two variants of the liberal multicultural model (Vermeulen and Penninx 2000). In the Netherlands, since the late '60s, a pluralist conception of the nation-state took hold: Dutch "minority policy" was translated in state and local authorities' active support to ethnic groups through specific targeted measures (Vermeulen and Penninx 2000). On the contrary, the British integration strategy was traditionally characterized by a relatively weaker state support to cultural and religious groups, and is thus often defined as "pluralist" (Soysal 1994; Koopmans and Staham 2000). The liberal model in both versions seems oriented to pursue decent ethnic relations and to produce a tolerance spread effect on the whole system.

The *functionalist* model is normally referred to countries adopting the so-called *guest workers or gastarbeiter* approach. It is based on a mix of political exclusion and cultural isolation, on the one hand, and access to equal rights in the socio-economic sphere on the other, although in the context of rotation migratory schemes. In the cultural domain, immigrants are not asked to abandon their language and culture because of the temporariness of their stay. This model intends to preserve immigrant integrity as far as workfare is concerned, while cultural integrity, is intended as an opportunity to keep the culture and the language of the country of origin, in the context of a rotation system. On the other hand, positive interaction is not a goal, and the desirable impact on the system concerns just the economic area. The functionalist model is commonly considered an "anti-immigration model" (Michalowski 2005). Germany used to be classified in this category. Starting by mid '90, Germany accepted to be a country of immigration and changed its nationality law and introduced integration policies. Anyway, even before the political turn, German actual performance in integrating immigrants seemed less poor than other more praised models (Koopmans 2002). What brings to the conclusion that factors different from specific policies of integration can prove relevant in influencing the integrative performance of a country (Boecker and Thraehardt 2003; Joppke 2006). It is quite evident that variables which are independent from specific integration policies are likely to play an important role. Immigration flows coming from countries that share the same linguistic background of the receiving country reduce the problem of the language barriers. English-speaking countries using English as national vehicular language, present an higher appeal in terms of language learning than countries or regions characterized by very confined languages. Apart from the evaluation of the actual impact of models of (non) integration policies in reaching the three goals, we must notice that models, intended as ideal-types which have been built by inductive method from national cases, should be regarded with some caution. The consistency between actual cases and models has always been very imperfect.

A) National cases have never completely matched with the models in which they were classified. For instance France accepted dual citizenship which would in theory contrast with an assimilationist attitude. The US not only invented the quota system but also made many exceptions to the separation between religion and state that should characterize the model. B) Local cases within the same national model have always diverged (Favell 2001; Caponio 2006), as in the case of Germany for instance, where social-democratic *Länders* have often adopted policies aimed at favouring cultural and social integration in contrast with the *Gastarbeiter* doctrine (Thränhardt 1992), or France, where cultural mediation has been introduced at a local level by some schools despite the rhetoric of Republican indifference to differences (Morel 2002). C) Different categories of immigrants (asylum seekers, temporary workers, students, co-ethnic aliens or aliens coming from countries connected to the receiving country by traditional bonds) have always received different treatments. The increasing differentiation of countries of origins and typology of migration is likely

to further differentiate treatments and strategies of integration. More tailored integration policies are now considered a desirable European strategy (Collett 2006).
Furthermore, in the last decade – as we have anticipated – the national policy models have entered into a phase of deep crisis due to their poor results in terms of what we have suggested to consider as the three main dimensions of integration and goals of integration policies.
Negative feed-back of the main national models of integration policies in reaching these goals can be considered as a factor leading to a growing revision and subsequent relative convergence of the national cases, leading to the theoretical crises of the models. The convergence is pushed by some negative factors and pulled by some public policy trends.
The common negative factors pushing revision are: rising riots and rising conflicts between immigrant minorities and traditional national minorities (Jews in particular), between nationals and minorities of immigrant origin, deviant and criminal behaviours, transnational terrorism, racist attitudes and attacks, public opinion fears and rejection of immigration, unemployment and poor educational results of some minorities, competition on scarce welfare resources.
The policy convergence is the output of some reform trends aimed at correcting the original models and controlling some of their negative outcomes.
A first trend we can single out is the *Leitkultur*: the request and requirement of knowing the vehicular language, the cultural tradition and public values of the receiving country. At the EU level this trend has been confirmed as a Common Basic Principle for Integration.[7] This goal is to be pursued though voluntary or compulsory attendance of integration courses that can be free or partially paid by immigrants themselves (Entzinger 2004, Groenindick 2006, Joppke 2006). In 1999 Germany firstly introduced the linguistic requirement as condition for the renewal of the residence permit (Groenindick 2006). It is meaningful that the Netherlands, a formerly multicultural country, has firstly introduced integration courses, which can be considered as an instrument of cultural assimilation, even if in a mild sense; this policy has been then followed by France and Germany. Attendance of the courses is not proving as high as expected, and their impact on integration is still to be evaluated (Groenindick 2006). According to Carrera, the establishment of a juridical framework based on compulsory integration as a prerequisite to have access to a 'secure juridical status', may have counterproductive effects on the social inclusion of the immigrant: "rather than providing a framework for the social inclusion of immigrants and the prevention of discrimination, such notions are rather (mis)using the device of 'integration' as a tool to put into practice a restrictive policy" (Carrera 2006, 2). Furthermore, "policies on admission are paradoxically converging with those of social inclusion" (*ivi*, 13). This is the case with the Netherlands, where pre-arrival integration courses were introduced in 2006.[8] The fact that these courses are usually not free of charge has also been criticized by pro-immigrants organizations and scholars. Compulsory education should be free and compatible with working schedules. However, we must add and underline that the knowledge of the vehicular language has proved a crucial instrument to prevent

[7] Principle 4 states that *the basic knowledge of the host society's language, history and institutions is indispensable to integration* and that *enabling migrants to acquire this basic knowledge is essential to successful integration*. As the *Communication for a Common Agenda for Integration (COM 2005/389)* has specified, introductory programmes to be implemented at national level can include pre-departure measures, such as information packages, language and civic orientation courses in the country of origin, and more specific courses while in the host country and should take into account different educational backgrounds and specific social and cultural problems. The EU level will stimulate trans-national actions and support innovative integration programmes.

[8] The bill, which had been presented by the Integration and Immigration Minister Rita Verdonk, was approved by the Dutch parliament on 22 March 2005. The law introduces the idea of 'pre-arrival integration' process or 'integration of immigrants abroad' (*Wet Inburgering in het buitenland*). newcomers have been obliged to pass an exam that proves their Dutch language skills and basic knowledge of Dutch culture and society before even entering the country. Once admitted to the Netherlands, migrants must attend – and successfully complete – civic integration courses in order to be granted both temporary and permanent permit renewals (Bruquetas-Collejo, Gracés-Mascareñas, Penninx and Scholten 2008). If integration is not considered satisfactory the entry visa can be refused.

immigrants downwards mobility (Drbohlav 2006) and that linguistic incompetence is considered by immigrants themselves as a main reason of discomfort (Pendenza 1999; Cotesta 2002).
A second trend is the public recognition and expression of respect towards the minority groups culture and religion, which should follow the renowned Charles Taylor (1993) public ethic proposal. This is however an uncertain trend, since in some countries even at central government level, offensive expressions have been directed towards immigrant minorities and their religions. And even more often, public recognition has been accompanied by assertion of religious and cultural roots of the receiving country and the reestablishments of old privileges.
A third trend is made out of antidiscrimination policies and more or less explicit forms of positive action (even in countries previously following an assimilationist model).
A fourth trend aims at avoiding the risk of welfare free-riding. At this end, the political line of providing mere assistance is more and more abandoned, while measures attempting to enable marginalized minorities to earn their living (professional training and retraining are the common instruments of this tread) are preferred.
A fifth trend consists in investing in ran down educational structures and neighbourhoods to improve their quality and eventually favour social desegregation- from community oriented policies to space oriented polices.
A sixth trend tries to move the frontiers of integration to immigration policies by making the relation between employment and residence permit stricter, by selecting immigrants with human or financial capital easy to be invested in and useful to the receiving country, by co-ethnic preference. As Sarkozy put it, there is a will to switch from an imposed to a chosen immigration. However, also in this set of migration policies, different national needs are producing different national choices, as Commissioner Frattini noticed (Frattini 2005, 21), selective immigration is not always considered a good choice, not only in terms of integrity of potential immigrants but also in terms of positive impact on the whole system, when the national economy is need also of unskilled workers.
Policy changes are motivated by what are perceived as negative feedbacks of the previous policies. What is now put in question are two features of the integration models and policies. We have already quoted the first i.e. the relations between policies and outcomes.
Are failures and success in integration matters due to policies or they do depend also and mainly on other factors?
Another even more relevant question has been risen by a French scholar (Lorcerie 2006).
Are failures due to the nature of the integration model or to the fact that the model did not keep its promises? Did the republican model keep its promises of universalistic treatment of all citizens besides their national or immigrant origins? Did the multicultural model keep its promises to treat with equal respect all the religious and ethnic minorities besides their national or immigrant origins?

Summing up empirical cases have never perfectly matched with ideal types, they have always presented deep differentiation at a local level, and for different categories. At a general and national level, the empirical cases had also further diverged from the original types under the pressure of new events. We still observe deep differences among EU member States, for instance in the matter of nationality laws (Bauböck, Ersbøll, Groenendijk and Waldrauch 2006), of long term resident (Groenindick 2006) and undocumented residents rights,[9] of political (Wauldrauch 2003) and social rights (Bommes & Geddes 2000), especially as far as religious minorities and Muslim minorities are concerned (Aluffi and Zincone 2004). However, as the characterising features of single national cases tend even if only slightly to fade, the empirical cases tend to slightly converge. Even though what we observe is an uncertain and uneven process of light convergence- whereas in France the foulard is banned (Law n. 228 March 15th 2004), in the UK, schools even provide for scarves which match with the school uniform. Even EU Directives do not produce the same results in all the

[9] See the Picum (Platform for International Cooperation on Undocumented Migrants) Reports 2000-2005, available on the website: www.picum.org.

EU countries. For instance the Directive on Long Term Residents rights does not avoid the persisting of strong differentiations among countries and the directive on antidiscrimination has been applied in different ways in France and Germany (Joppke 2006). Even though the impact of International and EU laws and measures is even more difficult to assert than the impact of national policies, it can be useful to recall the main lines of these provisions and check their possible consistency with the three goals we have suggested. Since integration has been declared as a priority in the Hague Programme for 2005-2010, we should check which instruments the EU has provided to reach this goal.

Main dimensions of immigrants integration and their inclusions in International and EU provisions

A crucial aspect when considering the **integrity** of migrants is the granting of a set of fundamental rights.

As for EU policy, already the Tampere Council in 1999 explicitly requested a more vigorous integration policy which should aim at granting legally resident third-country nationals rights and obligations comparable to those of the EU citizens (point 18 of the Tampere conclusions), namely the right to reside, to receive education and work as an employee or self-employed, as well as the principle of non-discrimination (point 21 of the Tampere conclusions). In fact, the Tampere Conclusions referred to some civil and political rights on the one hand, and to some social and economic rights on the other, as expressed respectively in the European Convention on Human Rights and in the EU Social Charter.[10] The focus on equal rights of all members of a community is reflected in the EU legal framework that promotes equal opportunities and combats discrimination on grounds of racial or ethnic origin, religion or belief, age, disability and sexual orientation. *Council Directives 2000/43/EC* and *2000/78/EC* give important rights to migrants in many fields, namely employment, education, social security, health care, access to goods and services and housing. The directives, however, do not cover discrimination on grounds of nationality and don't apply to the conditions of entry and residence of third-country nationals, as well as to any treatment which arises from their legal status.

As it is clear, the length of residence has an influence on the level of rights enjoyed by different categories of migrants (principle of incremental approach). According to the *Council Directive 2003/109/EC*, third-country nationals who have acquired long-term resident status[11] will enjoy equal treatment with nationals as regards as access to paid and unpaid employment, conditions of employment, education and vocational training, recognition of qualifications; welfare benefits, social assistance, social benefits, tax relief, access to goods and services; freedom of association and union membership; freedom to represent a union or association; free access to the entire territory of the Member State concerned. The Directive is also designed to give full effect to Article 63(4) of the EC Treaty by setting out the rights of third-country nationals residing legally in a Member State to be enjoyed also in other Member States. Moreover long-term residents enjoy enhanced protection against expulsion which cannot be based on economic considerations. However, in certain cases, Member States may restrict equal treatment with nationals with respect to access to employment and to education and may limit equal treatment to core benefits.

With conformity with the obligation to protect family and respect family life as enshrined in many instruments of international laws – in particular in article 8 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of 1950 and in the Charter of Fundamental

[10] The European Convention on Human Rights guarantees a set of civil and political rights, namely human dignity, freedom, equality and solidarity, regardless of nationality of origin or of race. The EU Social Charter concerns the rights to protection and assistance to be granted to migrant workers and their families as regards as housing, health, education, employment, legal and social protection, movement of persons, non-discrimination (article 19).

[11] According to the same directive, the main criteria for acquiring such status are five years' continuous legal residence, stable resources, and sickness insurance for the applicants and their family.

Rights of the EU Union - the *Council Directive on the right of family life reunification 2003/86/EC* establishes common rules of community law relating to the right to family reunification of third-country nationals residing lawfully on the territory of a Member State. Third country nationals who hold a residence permit valid for at least one year in one of the Member States and who have the genuine option of long-term residence can apply for family reunification, which, however, applies only to members of the nuclear family. It may apply also to relatives in the direct ascending line only if the single Member States legislation authorises it. Thus, even if EU Council Conclusions and Commission Communications have repeatedly acknowledged the need to grant a secure status and equal and fair treatment to legally resident third-country nationals and have stressed the role of family reunification in immigrants' life and life planning and its contribution to stability and to cohesive societies, the EU legislation has imposed few positive obligations on Member States, since directives only establish common minimum standards.[12] This situation simply accommodates existing divergence between national legislation. Thus the role of EU legislation as standard-setter could, in theory, pave the way to a downwards convergence of Member States' legislations.

The dimension of integration as **positive interaction** between natives and migrants is partially envisaged in the conception of integration as *a two-way process based on mutual rights and corresponding obligations of legally resident third-country nationals and the host society which provides for full participation of the immigrant* (*Communication on Immigration, Integration and Employment (COM(2003)336)*. The integration process conceived as mutual accommodation directs attention towards the attitudes of the recipient societies, their citizens, structures and organisations as well. In order to be successful, an integration policy must engage in local, regional and national institutions, with which immigrants interact, in both the public and private spheres. Moreover, the *Handbook on Integration for Policy-makers and Practitioners*, published in November 2004, acknowledges the fact that governments pay increasing attention to the personal dimension of integration and in particular to the frequency and intensity of social interaction with native population. Frequent interaction between immigrants and citizens is a fundamental mechanism for integration to be enhanced through shared forums, intercultural and inter-religious dialogue, education about immigrants and their cultures, improvement of the living conditions in urban environments (*Commission Communication COM (2005) 389).*

The dimension of positive interaction is deeply linked with the dimension of integrity, since the former is possible only if both the integrity of the migrants and the one of the nationals are respected. In this view, the *Commission Communication on a framework strategy for non-discrimination and equal opportunities COM (2005) 224* stresses the fact that integration implies the respect for the basic values of the receiving society. This should be (and at single Member States level, currently is) pursued through a strong emphasis on civic orientation in introduction programmes and other activities which will help immigrants to understand and respect the society which they are joining in. As underlined by the Communication, this measure is part of the framework strategy which should pave the way to the promotion of anti-discrimination and equal opportunities in order to tackle the structural barriers faced by migrants, ethnic minorities and other vulnerable groups.

The dimensions of integrity and of positive interaction are explicitly considered as prerequisites to facilitate third-country nationals' prospective contribution to the host society (*Commission*

[12] Antonio Vitorino, the former European Commissioner for Justice and Home Affairs, for instance, has criticized the 'diluted' terms of the Family Reunification Directive and has added that *it also contains several escape clauses allowing member states to exercise their existing immigration legislation, severely undermining the harmonisation of the directive* (*EUBusiness. EU finally agrees directive on family reunification*, 27 February 2003, available on the website: www.eubusiness.com/Living_in_EU/104455).

Communication COM (2005) 389). Yet, as far as the positive **impact of immigration on the whole system** is concerned, the EU focus is above all on socio-economic topics, such as on the impact of immigration on the labour market. In this view, the conditions and procedures of entry for migrant workers are crucial issues. The Thessaloniki European Council of June 2003 stated that the EU needs to explore *legal means for third country nationals to migrate to the Union, taking into account the reception capacity of the Member States, within the framework of an enhanced co-operation with the countries of origin*. The *COM (2003) 336* linked immigration and integration issues to the need to reach the economic objectives of the Lisbon Strategy. The possible positive impact of immigration on the economic systems of receiving countries is further acknowledged by the Hague Programme (Presidency Conclusions – Brussels, 4/5 November 2004), according to which legal migration will play an important role in enhancing the knowledge-based economy in EU, in advancing economic development and thus contributing to the implementation of the Lisbon strategy in a situation of decrease of the share of population of working age as forecasted by Eurostat (Data from STAT/05/48). However, despite the emphasis on the need for legal migration, there has been very little agreement on how to achieve this and, as underlined above, agreements have led to the setting of common minimum standards due to greatly diverging positions of Member States (Collett 2006). It should be noted that a Commission Proposal to create a single entry procedure for migrant workers (COM (2003) 386) has not been passed. This unsuccessful result has led to a process of consultation and to the awareness that no agreement is possible on the whole matter and that a piecemeal, sector-related strategy is needed. This explains why a less ambitious proposal for legal migration has been submitted in December 2005 (*Policy Plan on Legal Migration COM(2005) 669)*. The Communication, which sets a general framework directive and four specific instruments addressing the conditions and the procedures of admission for few selected categories of economic immigrants, is the first step towards the creation of *a policy plan on legal migration including admission procedures capable of responding promptly to fluctuating demands for migrant labour in the labour market.* Labour migrants covered by the proposals are those for which common needs and interests exist in different national labour markets: the highly-skilled workers, seasonal workers, Intra-Corporate Transferees and paid trainees. No opinion is expressed on the more controversial issue of low-skilled migrant labour which will be laid down in the specific instruments, even if it is anticipated that these instruments will not affect the application of the Community preference principle.[13] This principle can be seen both in the perspective of optimizing the positive impact on the labour market as well as in the perspective of preserving the "integrity" of the national labour force, preventing downwards competition. However, the Commission argues again that an effective migration policy cannot be limited to instruments for the admission of immigrants and that other equally important legislative and operational measures are necessary in order to maximize the effect of integration, such as measures on integration and fight against illegal immigration and employment.

As it is clear, **positive impact** is somehow subordinated to the **integrity** and **positive interaction** dimensions, thus implying that the system will beneficiate from immigration only insofar as immigrants are recognised access to fundamental rights and are object of positive integration policies. In this view, the most substantial step forward was the adoption, in November 2004, of 11 Common Basic Principles (CBPs) to *underpin a coherent framework on integration of third-country nationals*. Since then, the Commission has produced its agenda for a common policy on integration (COM(2005)389) which links the CBPs to a series of measures which Member States

[13] *Member States will consider requests for admission to their territories for the purpose of employment only where vacancies in a Member State cannot be filled by national and Community manpower or by non-Community manpower lawfully resident on a permanent basis in that Member State and already forming part of the Member State's regular labour market* (Council Resolution of 20 June 1994, in connection with Council Regulation (EEC) n°1612/1968). However it should be noted that the Treaties of Accession of 16 April 2003 and 25 April 2005 give preference to nationals of the Members States over workers who are third-country nationals as regards access to Member States' labour markets.

can use as a litmus test to improve their integration programmes. In fact such measures are 'indicative' and 'not exhaustive' and it is left to *Member States to set priorities and select the actions as well as the way in which they are to be carried out within the context of their own national situations and traditions.* As underlined by Collett (2006, 17), "the basic problem with this approach is that, to accommodate the policy diversity among Member States, the principles are broad statements with little substantive content". The majority of the CBPs are of a purely symbolic nature and the paradigm of a positive, two-way process is not easy to be implemented in the national arena; in fact, as already noticed, its application across the EU, and specially the trend towards *Leitkultur*, indicates that it can be interpreted as a straight one-way process on the immigrant's side (Carrera 2006). Moreover this 'soft policy approach' as carried out by the Council and the EU Commission, increasingly contrasts with proper European Community law (hard policy approach) provided by Directives on the status of long-term residents (2003/109) and on the right to family reunification (2003/86). The latter approach seems to strengthen the evidenced trend in a majority of member states in the direction of an increasingly mandatory integration policy.[14] This political turn has been criticized by those who observe that they "negatively link access to the rights they bestow (inclusion) to compliance by immigrants with a series of restrictive conditions left in the hands of the member states (exclusion), which are given wide discretion to stipulate national conditions for integration (conditionality of integration)" (Ibidem, 15).

[14]For instance, Art. 5 of Directive 2003/109 on the long-term resident status specifically points out that *Member States may require third-country nationals to comply with integration conditions, in accordance with national law*, while, among the specific provisions being contested in the EC/2003/86, there is Art. 4.1, which allows the member states to exclude the family reunification of children over 12 if they have not complied with an "integration requirement".

1. Goals, perspectives and areas of immigrants' integration



2. Measuring integration. A review of the indicators' literature

The literature on the indicators of immigrants' integration is only weakly related to the one on the integration theories and models analysed above. Usually, research studies that focus on finding measures and indicators start by establishing a minimal operative definition of integration, and then disaggregate its composing aspects. In particular, four different elements have been singled out in the literature:

- Integration policies and rights of immigrants;
- Immigrants social situation and condition;
- Immigrants' and nationals' attitudes, perceptions and identities[15];
- Outcomes in terms of *societal integration*.

In order to measure these different aspects of immigrants' social integration, various types of indicators have been proposed by the literature. Here below, in paragraph 3, we shall attempt to reclassify these indicators by looking at the three dimensions of the integration concept and goals of immigrant policies proposed in this paper, i.e. preserving *integrity* of immigrants, *positive interaction* and *positive impact* on the system.

But let's start by clarifying basic methodological options and problems underlying the attempts to measure immigrants' integration. We shall also specify better the different types of indicators proposed in the literature, in order to unreveal the definitions of integration implied in their use. While often presented as objective and neutral, indicators are not completely value free.

Preliminary methodological problems and options

A first problem that has to be faced when searching for indicators of immigrants' integration is that of defining clearly and unambiguously "who" we mean by using the term "immigrant". Disagreements on 'who should be counted' are far from rare, especially in cross-national EU and even more international comparisons (Niessen and Schibel 2005, 55), given the different policy instruments adopted to regulate migration-related phenomena (flows, entries, naturalisation etc.) and the diverging social definitions attached to categories such as immigrants, minority groups, second generation etc.

This is a crucial issue if we consider that indicators of immigrants' integration are very often constructed on the basis of **aggregate data**, i.e. data collected on the whole population – or on specific segments such as the people living in a region – by public institutions for bureaucratic and administrative purposes[16]. These data sources provide precious information for social research, and are usually used as a basis for analysing the main features characterising the foreign population living in a country, i.e. national origin, age and gender structure, territorial distribution in the country etc. As a consequence, differences in national registration systems may have a considerable impact on the assessment of the immigrant population living in different countries (Entzinger and Biezeveld 2003, 38-39). Some countries for instance, such as Denmark and the Netherlands, not only register foreign citizens, but also foreign born and children of foreign born, whereas other countries strongly object to keep special records of naturalised citizens, since this is perceived as discriminatory.

Along with differences in registration, also differences in naturalisation policies matter. In several EU Member States, for instance, migrants originating in the former colonies or with an ethnic

[15] The first three aspects clearly recall the three perspectives to the analysis of our integration goals (i.e., *integrity*, *positive interaction* and *positive impact*) mentioned in the first paragraph of this paper, i.e.: 1) rights and policies, 2) actual opportunities and conditions, and 3) perceptions and identities (see figure 1).

[16] Thus, following demographers, for *aggregate data*, we mean data collected on an aggregate basis, i.e. a population, as opposed to *survey data*, that are collected on the basis of sampling procedures. Of course, on both kind of date disaggregate analyses can be carried out, i.e. along variables such as gender, age, profession etc.

background in the country of settlement often posses or can obtain the citizenship of the host country at their arrival. However, even if not counted as immigrants, they may still be subject to various kind of integration policy. On the contrary, in *jus sanguinis* systems, children of foreigners born in the host country are counted as immigrants even though they have never immigrated.

In order to overcome these problems and to answer to the need for more fine-grained cross-national comparisons on immigrants' integration, especially among EU countries, the COMPSTAT (*Comparing National Data-Sources in the Field of Migration and Integration*) project has been launched in 2001. The project had three main objectives, i.e.: to collect and analyse essential technical information on various sorts of micro-datasets and statistics produced by public authorities and of an interest for the study of immigrants' integration; to contribute to establishing comparability of these data in Europe and the EU in particular; to provide information on where to look for data at the national level and on the quality of the data[17].

Problems of comparability may also be overcome through **survey data**, which are collected through sample survey research designs explicitly aimed at answering pre-defined research questions. This kind of data is thus extremely useful in order to get a more in-depth knowledge of integration processes and phenomena, such as for instance access to the labour market and employment in different regional areas across Europe[18]. While survey data may often be desirable, their collection is usually expensive, and limits may be encountered because of financial resources availability. This is especially the case with cross-national comparative research, that will require huge samples in order to yield robust and relevant results.

Another method that might reveal useful in order to collect data for the building of integration indicators is the **test experiment**, which has been used in order to assess levels of discrimination especially in the labour market, as we shall see below. The underlying logic is that of creating an experimental situation where an immigrant actor having the same characteristics of a national one applies for the same job/house/etc. Results are then compared: discrimination is assessed whenever differential treatment at the expense of the immigrant applicant occurs.

Finally, also **qualitative methods** may be used in research on integration indicators, such as for instance in-depth interviews and individual immigrants biographies. Qualitative research has usually the advantage of providing a lot of detailed data and information. Yet, these are usually collected on a small scale and only rarely can be treated with statistical techniques. Nonetheless, qualitative accounts are necessary in order to reconstruct groups and/or individual integration patterns and strategies, which might serve as a basis to rethink and redefine hypothesis to be tested on a larger scale through statistical analysis of administrative and/or survey data.

Along with surveys, qualitative analysis of the language and content of press reporting may also be regarded as a promising research technique in order to get information on changing majority population attitudes towards immigration (Coussey and Christensen 1997, 22).

Another distinction which is very common the literature is that between **objective** and **subjective indicators** (Niessen and Schibel 2005, 59). Objective indicators provide "hard" information of a statistical or legal kind, and measure for instance unemployment rates, or, in the case of policy indicators (see below), access to certain rights such as local franchise for instance. Subjective indicators, on the other hand, are essential in order to capture attitudes and perceptions, such as for instance job satisfaction or feelings of identification and belonging in a particular community. As we shall see below, survey research is particularly suited to provide this kind of information, which is crucial to analyse changing perceptions of migrants towards the majority population and vice

[17] The COMPSTAT project has been founded by the EU Commission in the context of the 5th Framework Programme, within the Key Action "Improving the Socio-economic Knowledge Base", and coordinated by the ICMPD (International Centre for Migration Policy Development) and the European Centre for Social Welfare Policy and Research. The COMPSTAT data sets are available on the website of the project, www.compstat.org.

[18] This was the purpose of the research partnership between the regions Lombardy (Italy), Andalusia (Spain) and Wallonie region (Belgium), undertaken in the context of the Alameda network, financed by the European Social Fund (Cologna, Gregori, Lainati and Mauri 2005).

versa. Also qualitative research methods can be employed at this purpose, even tough with the limits mentioned above.
According to the Council of Europe (1997, 2000), comprehensive monitoring systems should include both objective and subjective indicators. 'Subjective aspects', including feelings about one's own situation or achievement, might reveal as important as 'objective indicators' measuring economic components of integration (Montgomery 1996). This implies that immigrants should be given a voice in defining indicators of integration, as well as in the process of policy evaluation (Castles et al. 2002).
The **participation of stakeholders**, i.e. foreign immigrants, is an open issue, which clearly points to the relevance of qualitative methods in research studies on immigrants integration. Anonymous, self-administered questionnaire, usually incur in higher non-response rates among immigrant populations, especially when just the vehicular language is used. Language and literacy problems are the more obvious explanations. Moreover, especially as far as issues of education are concerned, questions often do not take sufficiently into consideration differences between home and host countries educational systems. As a consequence, the validity of the responses is dubious. In order to overcome these problems and enhance quality of data, a number of solutions have been suggested in the literature to be used in special surveys, i.e.: training co-ethnic interviewers for face-to-face personal interviewing; developing national and ethnic language versions of questionnaires; closely tailoring questions, routings and response categories to reflect immigrant trajectories and orientations[19] (Phalet and Swyngedouw 2003, 779).

Types of indicators

As mentioned above, on the basis of the available literature four types of indicators can be identified: 1) indicators of *accessibility*, concerning the legal framework in which migrants live, i.e. *policies and rights*; 2) indicators describing the *actual situation* of migrants in the host country, monitoring thus social integration processes; 3) indicators of the *attitudes, perceptions and identities* of migrants and of the majority population[20]; 4) indicators measuring the *impact of immigration on the whole system*, i.e. societal integration.
1) Indicators of accessibility or Policy and rights indicators are usually developed in order to monitor legal standards, entitlements and policy arrangements aimed at improving the integration of immigrants (Niessen and Schibel 2005, 62). The purpose is that of allowing comparison between different integration policy frameworks, either at a national or local level, and eventually leading to the identification of *best practices*, i.e. policies who appear to better cope with immigrants needs and problems.
Two main attempts of developing coherent systems of policy indicators have to be mentioned: the *Index of Legal obstacles of Integration*, developed by the Institute of Advanced Studies, Vienna (Hofinger 1997, 23); the *European Civic Citizenship and Inclusion Index*, proposed by the British Council, the Foreign Policy Centre and the Migration Policy Group (Geddes and Niessen 2005).
The *Index of Legal obstacles of Integration*, starts from the assumption that the destines of immigrants are widely determined by national legal systems (Hofinger 1997). The index is designed in order to compare legal obstacles to integration horizontally, i.e. between several countries[21] at time x, as well as vertically, i.e. between different points in time for a specific country Y. It includes almost 80 different legal issues grouped in five main areas, i.e.: residence, labour market, family reunion, naturalisation, second generation. Scores on each dimension are assigned within a range from zero to 1. A value of zero means that a country imposes almost no legal obstacles upon

[19] These techniques have been employed in the 1990s in a series of special surveys among Turkish and Moroccan immigrants in Belgium. See: Phalet and Swyngedouw 2003.
[20] These first three categories were already identified by the Council of Europe in 1995 (Council of Europe 1997).
[21] Eight countries have been investigated by the index: Austria, Belgium, Switzerland, Germany, France, the Netherlands, Sweden and the United Kingdom (Hofinger 1997, 24).

integration, whereas a value of one indicates the presence of a great number of restrictions and, thus, of an extremely rigid legislation.
As for the *European Civic Citizenship and Inclusion Index*, the starting point is represented by an explicit normative framework emphasising principles of equal treatment and inclusion in five crucial domains, i.e. access to the labour market, family reunion, long-term residence, naturalisation and anti-discrimination[22]. In more concrete terms, each of the almost 100 indicators developed by the index refers to a very specific policy in one of the five areas and it measures to what extent the policy satisfies the normative framework requirements. For instance, in the case of labour market inclusion policies, indicators are intended to measure: access and eligibility, security of employment status, labour market integration measures and rights associated with labour market participation.
In terms of the integration models theories listed above, the policy indicators elaborated in the context of the *European Civic Citizenship and Inclusion Index* do not take into account issues of recognition of immigrants' cultural difference, but are essentially committed with universal rights principles. However, such an approach cannot be labelled as assimilationist. Indicators of favourable nationality policies include items such as: "No language or citizenship tests (including knowledge of history and institutions) apply" (Geddes and Niessen 2005, 171); "When acquiring the nationality of a Member State it is not necessary to give up the original nationality of another state. Children born to parents of different nationality or different from the Member State are entitled to dual citizenship automatically at bird" (ibid., 172).
The Council of Europe *Social Cohesion Indicators' System* (European Council 2005, 169-173), takes also into consideration the issue of adjusting cultural diversity. This is particularly the case in the first dimension identified as crucial, i.e. equality before rights and non discrimination. In this context, a particular relevance is assigned to the availability of vocational training courses in different languages, as well as to translation services, which are supposed to facilitate immigrants access to public services. As for the second dimension, i.e. immigrants' dignity/recognition, along with policies aimed at fostering individual acculturation/assimilation, such as national language courses and training on the main norms and institutions of the host country, measures oriented at valorising ethnic and religious diversity in the media and the education system are also mentioned, thus allowing for a positive evaluation of cultural diversity in integration policy.
However, **policy and rights indicators** tell us something on the premises of story, i.e. how a political system sets the basis for access to rights and social opportunities. Yet, implementation, which usually takes place at a local level, may somehow influence conditions of access to rights, while other social variables are likely to have an impact on the concrete opportunities offered to immigrants. In order to assess the concrete impact of a certain policy, the development of a sub-type of policy indicators, i.e. **policy outcomes indicators** is required. These are usually defined with reference to specific policy measures explicitly aimed at fostering immigrants' integration. The assumption is that while integration is a multidimensional and complex process, still policy may have an impact. In order to single out this impact, the conditions before and after the introduction of the policy measure under investigation have to be carefully examined and intervening variable put under control. Such indicators may also serve as measures for policy evaluation.
2) Indicators of immigrants' social integration, or, according to the Council of Europe (1997; 2000), of **migrants' actual situation**, are usually referred to the three main spheres or areas of the social structure (see figure 1), i.e. the *socio-economic* sphere, the *cultural and religious* sphere and the *public and civic* sphere. These represent also the three main dimensions into which the concept of social integration has been frequently operationalised (Entzinger and Biezeveld 2003).
In general, social integration indicators, especially as far as the economic area is concerned, are based upon the implicit assumption that integration should ideally result into statistical indifference, i.e. in immigrants' gradually performing and adopting patterns of behaviour similar to those of the

[22] These are derived from 15 EU member states commitments agreed upon in the Tampere declaration (October 1999) and in the Directive on the status of long term residents (November 2003).

majority of the population. In terms of the integration models analysed above, this might result in individual assimilation.
However, two criticisms can be advanced to such an assumption. On the one hand, differences on some indicators may yield to ambiguous interpretations: results which might be read as showing a lack of integration, may also signal different patterns and/or strategies of inclusion, as we shall see below in the case of housing concentration for instance.
On the other, and this is a crucial point, integration could also be achieved when immigrants, while retaining much of their cultural background, are equal to native citizens in access to the host society resources and institutions (Doomernik 1998, 2). This implies that the three spheres cannot be put on the same level: similarity in terms of employment rates, income and access to social security, does not necessarily require immigrants to get assimilated under the cultural point of view. In other terms, the *economic sphere* as to be regarded as crucial in order to assess immigrants level of integration into the host society, since achieving a position of equality in this area tantamount at enjoying equal opportunities in access to rights and social resources.
As for the *socio-cultural and religious sphere*, a minimum level of acculturation, such as a good knowledge of the vehicular language, might be sufficient in order to get access to the host country resources and improve individual social integration. In any case, the complete abandonment of ones' traditional customs, values and religion has by no means to be considered a prerequisite for integration, as pointed out by the multiplicity of patterns of cultural accommodation pointed out in research studies on "transnational" communities and immigrant networks within and outside Europe (Portes 1995; Levitt 2005; Esser 2004a).
Similarly, also on the *public and civic sphere*, the acceptance of the host country rules and norms does not imply complete assimilation. Research on associational participation for instance, has showed how considering membership into community associations as an indicator of non-integration cannot but be misleading (Fennema 2004; Fennema and Tillie 2004). Immigrant associations, even when base on co-ethnic ties, are an instrument to set up a link with the host society. They are often represented in local and/or national consultative committees, take part in festivals and events organised by the local authorities, set up initiatives with host society pro-immigrant organisations and so forth. Membership in a community association probably might better represent an attempt to take part in the host society social life through the valorisation of ones' cultural identity and background.
3) Indicators of the attitudes, perceptions and identities of migrants and of the majority population are crucial in order to assess the outcome of social interaction processes between foreign nationals and the recipient society. The assumption behind is that integration is a two-way process, that does not imply mere immigrants' adaptation, but rather interaction and exchange with the receiving population. In order to find out the outcomes of such an interaction, specific indicators have to be developed. These usually are based on the opposition between, on the one hand, parochial/community oriented attitudes/perceptions/identities, and on the other, universalist/individual oriented attitudes/perceptions/identities.
Subjective indicators collected through survey research studies are of the utmost relevance in this research field. The Eurobarometer has already surveyed dimensions like "multicultural optimism", support for policies that aim at improving migrants' social conditions, controversial issues such as repatriation, restrictive immigration measures, blaming of immigrants and the need for assimilation. As we shall see below, the literature has also identified a number of objective indicators which can be used in order to assess indirectly migrants attitudes towards native citizens and vice-versa.
However, subjective indicators, either collected through surveys or other more in-depth qualitative research methods, are often preferred, since these enable the researcher to reconstruct and make sense of complex attitudes and identity patterns laying in between the opposed parochialism/universalism poles.
4) Finally, **indicators of the impact of immigration on the whole society, i.e. societal integration outcomes**, appear still poorly developed in the literature. The purpose is that of assessing beneficial

and/or negative effects of immigration for the social system, effects which may be defined in different ways. Demographers, for instance, have mainly searched for indicators of impact on the different countries demographic/age structure, whereas economists have looked more at the impact of immigration on the labour market and on the economic system in general. We shall analyse more in-depth these indicators below. However, what these indicators start from a common assumption, i.e. that immigration *per se* may or may not have a positive effect on the economic and demographic structure of the receiving society.
As is clear, these indicators by emphasising issues of demographic and economic structure stability, risk to overlook the need for social integration, which requires some kind of participation and inclusion of the individuals, immigrants included, in the society. This is what sociologists and political scientists usually call **social cohesion**. The point should thus be modified in term of the search for indicators of the impact of immigration on the society social cohesion.

3. Which indicators for what integration. An assessment

Measuring immigrants integration cannot but be a difficult task, despite the wide range of indicators deployed in the literature mentioned above. The main problem is that of fixing a clear framework of reference to function as a yardstick against which to compare the validity of integration indicators. Going beyond assimilationist and multicultural integration models, and drawing on EU policy principles, we have proposed a definition of integration as a two-ways mutual process, where three crucial dimensions have to be singled out: a) preservation of immigrants *integrity*; b) *positive interaction* between ethnic groups and nationals; c) *positive impact* on the whole system.
Positive impact, however, cannot be satisfactory achieved if conditions of immigrants integrity and positive interaction are not explicitly set out and guaranteed. The fact that economists and demographers have widely acknowledged the positive impact of immigration on ageing population structures, in terms of sustainability of pension schemes and of otherwise decreasing fertility rates, has not prevented the emerging of racist attitudes towards foreign workers all over Europe, as pointed out by the electoral success of rightwing anti-immigration parties such the *Vlaams Block* in Belgium, the *Pim Fortuyn* list in the Netherlands or the *Front National* in France. At the same time, social exclusion and deprivation are likely to challenge the social system stability and cohesion, as stressed by terrorism and urban riots spurring from time to times across European and US cities.
Following the same structure of the first part of this paper, we shall first discuss critically the main indicators of immigrants integration proposed by the literature. The discussion will follow the three dimensions set above, i.e. *integrity*, *interaction* and *impact*, in order to assess the relevance of existing indicators *vis-à-vis* the conceptualisation of integration proposed in this paper. For each dimension, we shall try to differentiate indicators along the three different perspectives and areas of integration pointed out in figure 1.
Thus, in the final paragraph we shall attempt to advance a new possible research agenda, by devising a battery of crucial indicators for measuring immigrants level of adjustment in the receiving society and progress (or deterioration) over time will be proposed.

Preservation of immigrants integrity

The issue of immigrants' integrity has been treated by existing literature on the indicators of integration essentially under two perspectives, i.e. the rights and policy perspective and the one centred on immigrants' actual situation and conditions (see fig. 1).
From a rights and policy perspective, the possibility to get access to a **secure residence status**, not subject to administrative discretion and protected against repatriation, is a basic requirement for immigrants' integrity, since to enjoy a stable and secure social position allows for family reunion and access to civil and social rights. As a consequence, a number of policy indicators (Geddes and Niessen 2005, Hofinger 1997) have been proposed, in order to compare different countries under the aspect of **formal conditions of access to a secure legal status**. Two main indicators are the

waiting period and the **number of conditions** required in order to acquire a long-term residence permit. The **security** of this status has also to be considered, i.e. for how long is the long-term residence permit valid? And is it automatically renewable? Which are the grounds for withdrawal? Finally, legal indicators have also been proposed in order to assess the number and type of the **rights** associated to long-term status.

Allowing for **family reunion** is another crucial requirement in order to preserve immigrants' integrity and it is recognised as a human right. As a consequence, all European countries make it possible, but conditions may differ considerably. For instance, the *European Civic Citizenship and Inclusion Index* considers issues of eligibility, i.e. waiting period required in order to apply for family reunification and relatives entitled to enter (spouse/registered partner/minor children/dependent adult children/dependent relatives); additional conditions (accommodation, economic resources etc.) and procedures; the security of the status of the entitled family members; the rights associated to it (Geddes and Niessen 2005, 169-170).

Access to the labour market is another indispensable condition in order to have immigrants integrity preserved. According to the *European Civic Citizenship and Inclusion Index* policy indicators should measure access and eligibility, i.e. if restrictions are in place that limit immigrants' access to certain positions of jobs (for instance in the public sector or to self-employment), security of employment status, labour market integration measures and rights associated with labour market participation. Finally, since also **discrimination** may endanger individual integrity, indicators concerning anti-discrimination legislation have also been proposed (Geddes and Niessen 2005, 173). These are aimed at assessing the scope given to the definition of discrimination, the accessible remedies, the presence of equality agencies as well as of pro-active policies aimed at promoting equality and combating racism.

However, as mentioned above, **policy and rights indicators** account just for part of the story, i.e. i.e. for the legal basis of access to rights and social opportunities. In order to assess if and to what extent integration as preservation of immigrants integrity is actually realized, indicators of **immigrants' actual situation and condition** are required. As mentioned above, usually these are referred to three main area or spheres of social integration, i.e. the economic, the cultural-religious and the civic-legal sphere. As for the dimension of *integrity*, indicators' of immigrants' actual situation in the **economic sphere** cannot but be crucial, since it is through participation/inclusion in the economic life that satisfaction of individual needs – for immigrants and nationals alike – of material subsistence is possible. In particular, the literature has focused so far on four groups of indicators of economic integration: employment and participation into the labour market; level of education; social security; housing and segregation.

The first and most widely acknowledged indicators of successful integration are those related with participation of immigrants in the **labour market** (Bauböck 1994; Coussey and Christensen 1997; Doomernik 1998; Golini, Strozza and Amato 2001). In this context, the notion of statistical indifference is the benchmark: immigrants are integrated insofar as indicators yield values which are similar to those characterising the native population. **Distribution per type of job and occupational sectors** are crucial, since these indicators help to identify if immigrants are equally represented in the main economic sectors, or if they tend to be concentrated in lower skills levels as well as in dangerous/dirty jobs. A particular attention should be paid also to **proportions in key professions** (Coussey and Christensen 1997, 18), such as architects, lawyers, engineer, doctors etc., which signal levels of social mobility in the migrant population. As for **unemployment rates** and **income levels**, these are relevant indicators only insofar as they are controlled for employment sector, in order to find out whether migrants face the same risks of unemployment and receive the same income of native workers employed in the same sectors.

Rates of **participation into the labour market** are also relevant, especially as far as women participation is concerned (Golini, Strozza and Amato 2001, 126). Whereas participation rates substantially below native women's average may signal exclusion and segregation, participation

rates substantially above the average seem to highlight strictly labour oriented migratory projects, and thus a possible lack of integration in other social spheres.
The fact that immigrants usually show lower levels of professional mobility and high rates of concentration in unskilled occupations is sometimes explained with a possible lack of qualifications and professional training required by the labour market. However, also issues of **discrimination** have to be taken into account. At this end, additional indicators should be considered. Castles et al. (2002, 124) suggest to look at the number of job applications made, interviews attended and job offers granted. The **discrimination testing method** (Bovenkerk 1992; 1999) allows to provide for such indicators by looking at the behaviours of the labour-market gate-keepers, i.e. employers. In concrete terms, an experiment is carried out where pairs of candidates, one national and one immigrant with similar characteristics except for their national background, apply for the same job. Discrimination is assessed on the basis of differential treatment in the three critical events of job application procedure: 1) being invited to apply for the job after phone inquiry; 2) being invited for an interview; 3) face to face interaction and eventual job offer. ILO has adopted this method to determine the occurrence of discrimination in access to the labour market in the United States, Belgium, Germany, the Netherlands, Spain and Italy, showing how discrimination in access to employment is a considerable phenomenon in all these countries, concerning at least one out of three application procedures presented by foreigners.
On the other hand, high rates of **self-employment** among immigrants workers may signal a relative high level of integration, since usually to set a business requires a deep knowledge of the host country norms and regulations. However, a rate considerably above the average may also indicate difficulties of access to mainstream occupations, what pushes immigrants to start their own business activities. These latter might be favoured by native employers in order to avoid social costs through subcontracting. In this case, self-employment is actually hiding a dependent work relationship.
Strictly related to employment and participation in the labour market is the field of **education**. In this respect, integration can be qualified as successful if the level of education achieved by immigrants in the host country, especially as far as the second generation is concerned, is similar to that of the national population. Particular attention should be paid to the **quality of education** (Golini, Strozza and Amato 2001, 124; Golini et al. 2004): are foreign students equally distributed in all kinds of secondary schools and universities? Or are there concentrations in technical and professional institutes? And do they enrol in universities at the same rates as their native peers? Also foreign students' **dropout rates and school performance** indicators should be considered (Council of Europe 2005, 170). Levels of **knowledge of host country language**, as well as rates of enrolment in **adult language training** (Coussey and Christensen 1997, 19), can be regarded as relevant indicators of economic integration, since fluency in the vehicular language is likely to open up access to better job opportunities.
As for the use of **social security**, two different indicators have been developed (Entzinger & Biezeveld 2003, 32). The first one is the **level of dependency**, which measures the use of social welfare and unemployment benefits and is regarded as an indicator of scarce integration. On the other hand, the **use of child benefits and pension schemes** is a sign that immigrants are conscious of their rights and are able to take advantage of them. The closer are the rates to those of the native population, the more these may be regarded as signalling integration, even though differences in the age and gender structure have to be carefully taken into account.
A major issue in the area of social security is **access to health care**. Data on access to different types of health care services, i.e. generalist/emergency versus specialist and preventive medicine are crucial. Higher rates of use of emergency services on the part of foreigners is usually assumed to be an indicator of difficulties in getting access to mainstream health care. This might signal the necessity to somehow adapt services in order to meet immigrants specific needs. Epidemiological surveys, while few and far from systematic (Ingleby et al. 2005), show that usually immigrants enjoy poorer health conditions than the average of the native population and refer a lower level of satisfaction with existing services. However, in order to assess if and to what extent this is the result

of discriminatory attitudes, data on immigrant groups should be carefully compared with data collected on segments of the native population having the same characteristics in terms of socio-economic position.
A further relevant indicator in order to measure socio-economic integration is the **quality of housing and residential segregation**. If migrants systematically live in poorer housing conditions than the rest of the population, this is clearly a sign of exclusion. A growing in the number of immigrants owning their houses might be regarded as signalling stabilisation and integration, even though the overall characteristics of the housing market in a specific country have to be considered. If social housing policies are limited, people may be more inclined to buy a house.
Finally, housing segregation, either at a district, neighbourhood or city level, is often regarded as an indicator of exclusion and social distress. However, it should be kept in mind that migrants, especially at the very start of their migratory project, may eventually prefer to live closely together with their community, in order to get resources and support which might help them in integrating in the new society (Entzinger and Biezeveld 2003, 21). At the beginning of the migratory experience, concentration might be at least in part a matter of choice. Yet, if it is constantly correlated with poor housing quality, processes of exclusion are likely to be underway.
But preserving immigrants integrity implies also to protect their personal safety. And since integration is a mutual, two-way processes, also nationals integrity should be taken into account. At this end, **judicial indicators** (Coussey and Christensen 1997) such as crime rates, comparative data on immigrants' arrest and conviction, as well as on racially violent crimes and complaints of discrimination, appear particularly relevant. However, since these are also measures of *positive interaction*, we shall treat them more in depth here below.

Positive interaction

The literature on the indicators of immigrants' integration has treated issues of *positive interaction* under three main perspectives, i.e. by looking at policies and rights, at immigrants' actual conditions and situation, and, finally, at attitudes, perceptions and identities. Let's see the main indicators proposed by these different perspectives.
From a **policy and rights** perspective, crucial indicators are those concerned with **anti-discrimination legislation and policies**, since discrimination not only threaten immigrants' individual integrity, but is also an obstacle to positive social relations. Through discrimination, immigrants are denied access to social resources which might reveal crucial for improving integration in the host society, such as for instance access to prestigious professions. **Indicators of anti-discrimination policy** should thus be directed at detecting legal provisions which are likely to discriminate against foreign nationals, as well as at measuring to what extent the political system has approved and enforced specific legislation aimed at preventing and combating discriminatory behaviours.
On the other hand, if we look at the dimension of *interaction* under the perspective of immigrants' social condition and actual situation, two kind of indicators are usually regarded as crucial by the literature, i.e. **socio-cultural integration indicators** (referring to the socio-cultural and religious sphere) and **political integration indicators** (referring to the civic and public sphere). Socio-cultural indicators, especially those aimed at assessing adherence to core values and norms of the host country, can reveal extremely controversial, since implicitly assume integration as a synonymous of acculturation: immigrants are considered as well integrated insofar as their values and behaviour patterns get closer and closer to those of the majority population. However, as it has been pointed out, a key question is that of identifying what exactly constitutes the core values of the receiving society, its basic rules and cultural tenets (Entzinger and Biezeveld 2003, 22; Coussey and Christensen 1997, 11). This is usually an unquestioned issue: the idea that states somehow characterise as culturally homogeneous is often taken for granted when assessing immigrants' socio-cultural integration.

Is this the case of indicators such as **fertility rates** and **migrant women participation into the labour market**. According to the literature, foreign women's decreasing fertility rates and increasing participation in the workforce signal a changing of values, where adherence to traditional culture fades in favour of host country life style and behaviours (Golini, Strozza and Amato 2001, 98-99). However, these behaviours might also be an indicator of the commitment to a strictly economic migratory project, which requires the giving up of traditional family patterns, but do not necessarily favour integration. On the contrary, it may end up in a work oriented life style, with no contacts with the host country population.

Also **crime rates** are usually considered as relevant indicators of socio-cultural integration. Crime rates substantially above the native population average are often regarded as signalling cultural alienation, since the basic rules and norms of a society are not accepted by the offender. However, when comparing immigrants and non-immigrants in this respect, class and age differences have to be carefully controlled. Also differences in national juridical systems have to be considered, since the range of deviant behaviours sanctioned by penal legislation might be different.

Another type of indicators of socio-cultural integration are those aimed at measuring **social contacts**. According to the literature, integration is supposed to be taking place insofar as migrants intensify contacts with the host society at the expenses of those with their community and country of origin. A very used indicator are **remittances**: these are supposed to become less and less relevant with stabilisation in the host country. However this trend might be contradicted by successful transnational strategies of integration. These are based on the capacity to build stable networks of relations with the country of origin, that are a crucial resource for ethnic business and transnational trade activities. Also **intermarriage rate** is often considered an indicator of cultural integration, whereas the choice to marry someone from the country of origin is regarded as signalling potential exclusion. Yet, this indicator has to be regarded with caution. Marriage with national citizens may in some cases open up easier access to long-term residency and citizenship: high mixed marriage rates may uncover individual strategies to get access to a secure legal status, even though stricter legislation has been introduced by Member States to curtail such practices. Moreover, actual integration is likely to depend more on the social status and contacts – the so called social capital – of the national partner than on intermarriage *per se*. Finally, also rates of divorces among mixed couples should be taken into consideration, since these may signal complex patterns of interaction, contradicting images of linear, one-sided integration.

Naturalisations represent another frequently used indicator of adherence to host country values and norms, since it is supposed to signal and individual willingness to become an equal part of the new home country. However, some cautions are required. Changing naturalisation requirements, such as for instance the decision to admit dual citizenship, may have an influence on naturalisation rates. This is also the case of the introduction of policies favouring the acquisition of the nationality on the basis of co-ethnic principles, as in the case of Italy: between 1998 and 2004, about 240,0000 foreigners who could prove some Italian ascendancy have obtained the Italian citizenship by applying to Italian consulates abroad, and without any obligation to transfer their residency in Italy (see Zincone 2006; Gallo and Tintori 2006). This does not mean however that once obtained the passport these citizens will be also, *ipso facto*, integrated from a socio-cultural point of view (Coussey and Christensen 1997, 12).

Other indicators aimed at analysing **contacts** between immigrants and host society in the private sphere or in public institutions such as school for instance, have been developed in the context of opinion survey research studies. However, methodological problems have to be faced in defining what a contact is about (Entzinger and Biezeveld 2003, 34). De Palo, Faini and Venturini (2005) suggest to look at the **use of leisure**. While neglected in traditional analyses, it may on the contrary represent a crucial factor in the process of immigrants integration, since an active social life can have positive spillovers also on the labour market performance. At this end, the authors analyse data drawn from the European Community Household Panel, a large household survey run from 1994 to 2001 in 15 European countries, which devoted a full section to the role and relevance of social

relations both for migrants and natives. Two questions are regarded as crucial: 1) how often do you talk with your neighbour?; 2) how often do you meet friend or relatives not living with you, whether here at home or elsewhere? Results show that, even when controlling for age, education, family size and employment status, immigrants tend to socialize less than natives. However, the length of the stay appear to have some beneficial effect on the intensity of immigrants' social relations, that becomes with the time more and more similar to that of the native population.

Finally, indicators of cultural integration often mentioned in the literature such as **language skills** and **children school achievement** are more than measures of acculturation. These actually represent preconditions for *preserving individual integrity*: children education and a basic knowledge of the vehicular language are necessary in order to get access to rights and resources such as participation in the labour market and professional mobility. This is why we treated these kind of indicators in the previous paragraph.

Along with indicators of socio-cultural integration, also **indicators of political participation** may provide hints on immigrants' interaction with the host society. The crucial indicator is of course **participation into election**, i.e. the comparison of turnout and voting patterns of immigrants who are entitled to vote with those of the electorate as a whole. Moreover, as suggested by Entzinger and Biezeveld (2003, 35), also the number of migrants councillors and the number of MPs with an immigrant background may be an interesting indicator of involvement among immigrant communities. Yet, there are limitations to this type of analysis, since only naturalised immigrants have the right to vote and to be elected. Foreign residents may be admitted to local elections, depending on national different legislations.

As a consequence, it might be more interesting to look at indicators of **participation in civil society** at large. As mentioned above, the key question here is whether membership in mainstream organisations should be accounted for in the same way as membership in ethnic and immigrant associations. Whereas participation in national unions, political parties and third sector organisations clearly signal increasing social contacts and socialisation to host country values, foreign groups associations may contribute to foster segregation. However, as mentioned above, according to a number of empirical research studies, also participation in this kind of associations may contribute to increase individuals' social capital, and to familiarise them with the receiving society norms and associational patterns.

At the same time, immigrant associations may represent also an element of enrichment for the host society, opening it to diversity and multiculturalism. According to the dimension of *positive interaction*, integration as to be thought as a two-way process, producing some kind of change also in the native population, such as for instance acceptance of migrants cultures and different identities. However, if and to what extent such a two-way process is actually taking place is a controversial point. At this end, a number of indicators assessing **actors' attitudes, perceptions and identities,** i.e. immigrants attitudes towards host country norms and rules on the one hand, and native citizens' attitudes towards cultural difference and immigration on the other, have been investigated, especially through survey research studies.

As mentioned above, this is the case of Eurobarometer surveys, that has been particularly involved in monitoring public opinion moods on immigration in Europe over time. Also at a national level various surveys are regularly carried out on these matters. In Belgium, for instance, from 1991 to 1993 a special survey on a representative sample of Turkish and Moroccan women aged 17 to 49 (Phalet and Swyngedouw 2003, 779) was undertaken, monitoring attitudes on issues such as family formation (marriage, fertility and family structure), community building (migration, settlement and home/host country orientations), socio-economic attainment (language, education, segregation and labour market participation) and socio-cultural change (gender roles, child rearing, religion and modernity). In 1997-1998, another survey carried out in Brussels region attempted to compare immigrant and host attitudes towards ethnic relations, identity, language, culture and politics on the

basis of a sample covering Turkish, Moroccan and Belgian responders[23] (Phalet and Swyngedouw 2003, 780). Turkish and Moroccan respondents were asked to what extent they wished to maintain their cultural heritage and/or to adapt to Belgian host culture, by considering separately private (family) and public life (school and work). Similarly, also Belgian respondents were asked their opinion on the issue. Results show that native Belgians attach less importance to cultural maintenance and expect more cultural adaptation that Turkish and Moroccan immigrants. Nonetheless, both immigrant groups show to opt for a mixed strategy of integration, combining adaptation in the public sphere with maintenance of cultural heritage in the private one.

However, attitudes indicators may be somehow biased, especially when delicate issues are concerned, since there is always the risk that people give socially and politically "desirable" answers (Entzinger and Biezeveld 2003, 36). It follows that most of the indicators of cultural integration mentioned above are actually regarded as a proxy for measuring actors' attitudes. Rates of fertility, migrant women participation in the labour market, criminality, intermarriages and naturalisations measures behaviours which are often considered as signalling a positive/negative attitude towards host society norms and life styles, and thus adherence or lack of adherence to its core values. However, as we have seen above, caution is necessary, since behaviours may have different explanations (i.e., for instance, an economic oriented migratory project in the case of migrant women fertility rates and participation in the labour market).

On the part of the receiving society, reported **cases of discrimination** is an indicator commonly used to monitor native population attitudes'. However, the availability of these data is likely to depend on the extent to which victims report these episodes to the authorities (Doomernik 1998, 15) and on the effectiveness of the monitoring system. Incidence of discriminatory practices may not necessarily reflect a high level of discrimination in the society, but be rather an effect of efficient monitoring institutions (Entzinger and Biezeveld 2003, 36). Nonetheless, since discrimination is a concrete barrier to any possibility of positive interaction with the host society, to measure its occurrence cannot but be of the utmost relevance. As mentioned above, **discrimination testing** appears in this sense a promising method, since it is aimed at assessing behaviours, i.e. social interaction outcomes.

Lastly, a field were interaction between immigrants and host society become apparent is that of the **media** (Council of Europe 2005, 170). The way in which media report on immigration related issues might well reflect receiving society attitudes: counting the number of people of immigrant origin who actually appear in the media and analysing their roles can represent an interesting indicator of how integration processes are actually taking place.

Positive impact on the whole system

Impact of immigration on the whole system is more difficult to measure since it requires macro-indicators to assess tendencies and changes in the overall social system structure. As mentioned above, economists and demographers have developed indicators aimed respectively at measuring the **impact of immigrant labour force on the economic system and on the demographic age structure** of the receiving countries. Positive outcomes have been pointed out on both dimensions.

As for the **economic system**[24], immigrants have helped to revitalize production sectors which were doomed to disappear. A beneficial effect on the pension system has also been observed, since immigrants contribute with their work to the financing of existing pension schemes, provided of course that they are hired on the basis of regular contracts[25]. However, in this literature there is also a certain concern that unemployed immigrants and low cost foreign work might represent a burden for the state budget. Low cost unskilled immigrant workers breaking regular hiring rules, cannot but

[23] In addition, a similar survey concerning the same minorities was undertaken in the city of Rotterdam (Phalet, Van Lotringen and Entzinger 2000), thus allowing also for cross-city/cross-national comparison.

[24] For a review of this literature see: Venturini 2004.

[25] Moreover, accordingly to the principle of *individual integrity*, the right to enjoy retirement benefits even if living abroad should be recognised to foreign workers.

have negative effects on the economic system, such as competition with lower strata of the native workforce as well as slowdown of technological development. As a consequence, also in this literature there is a growing awareness of the need for integration policies, which could boost the immigrants contribution to the economy and alleviate the fiscal burden (De Palo, Faini and Venturini 2005).

In terms of **demographic trends**, immigration is often regarded as a solution to population ageing which may contribute to contrast declining fertility rates on the part of native women. Population projections and statistic often confirm such an hypothesis, at least on a medium time span period (Höhn 2005, 2). In the long run, caution should prevail: also migrant women show declining fertility rates, even if at a lower pace than native ones. Moreover, migrants ageing is likely to stop their beneficial impact on the security system. Immigrants can mitigate population ageing, but cannot be regarded as a definitive solution.

Moreover, indicators of societal integration on a pure economic or demographic basis can be in contrast with indicators of immigrants' social integration. The maintaining of traditional family patterns, if beneficial to the system, may reveal detrimental to the migrant woman if access to the labour market is impeded and she finds herself segregated the role of caregiver. At the same time, the presence of young working age immigrants cannot but have a contradictory effect if these are denied equal access to work and citizenship rights.

In general, on the level of societal integration, it has to be kept in mind that integration as a two-way process requires the **opening of the social system to new cultures and competences**. These might be considered as an enrichment for the receiving society. Indicators must be developed in order to find out if and to what extent a social system is taking advantage of immigrants' different cultural backgrounds. In this respect, **policy outcomes indicators** are needed. The purpose should be that of highlighting to what extent integration policies, beyond addressing specific group needs, may also contribute to an improvement of the **cohesion** of the social system as a whole.

Building a set of reliable and consistent indicators

After having critically illustrated the main indicators proposed by the literature, here below we shall attempt to propose a set of reliable and consistent indicators which should help to assess levels of immigrants integration in different host society domains, as well as improvement and/or deterioration over time. Rather than limiting to suggest few, synthetic measures, we agree with those that underline the necessity for a system of indicators combining different kinds of data and approaches (Castles et al. 2002), looking both at measures of objective and subjective integration.

Let's sum up the results of our review on the three dimensions of our definition of the integration concept, i.e. *preservation of immigrants integrity*, *positive interaction* and *positive impact on the whole system.* This will provide the basis for the identification of most relevant indicators on each dimension.

- Indicators listed under the first dimension, i.e. *preservation of immigrants integrity* are the more relevant ones, since they measure if conditions of equal access to rights and opportunities have been achieved. Among these, **economic indicators**, especially those concerning employment and access to the labour market have to be regarded as crucial.

  As a consequence, the building of a set of reliable and consistent indicators cannot but start by considering main measures of immigrants economic integration, i.e. employment/unemployment rates, proportions per different sector of occupation and level, proportion in key professions, income level, self-employment etc. All these indicators should be carefully controlled by age and gender. A particular attention should be paid also to the relevance of temporary contracts, which might be considered as a measure of work stability.

  At the same time, however, specific indicators should be designed in order to better focus issues of **discrimination**, which are likely to seriously threaten individual integrity. Indicators such as number of job applications made, interviews attended and job offers granted can be effectively

assessed through **discrimination testing methodology**. By measuring discrimination, testing methodology accounts for failures in immigrants economic integration.

Also **language skills** and **second generation education attainment** are indicators of the utmost relevance. Often regarded by the literature as measures of acculturation, actually these indicators refer to two crucial preconditions in order to get access to host country resources, i.e. vehicular language knowledge and equal opportunity for immigrant children mobility. In general, indicators concerning education and training should be considered as relevant for the assessing of the *immigrants' integrity* dimension. Exclusion on the labour market may start as exclusion from access to education, and especially to secondary, high level education. The comparative analysis of school careers' indicators of both immigrants and natives students may help to identify if discriminatory behaviours are taking place.

Other crucial indicators of economic integration refer to **housing** and **access to health services**. Both aspects are crucial for the *preservation of immigrants' integrity*. Also in this case, existing indicators may help in gaining a first picture on issues of housing segregation and concentration, as well as on immigrants' state of health. However, in a second step a more in-depth analysis into – eventual – differential treatment should be carried out. In the case of housing, for instance, **discrimination testing methodology** has been applied in Italy in order to find out if and to what extent Italian housekeepers and intermediation agencies adopt discriminatory behaviours towards foreigners (Comitato Oltre il Razzismo 2000).

- As for the dimension of *positive interaction*, this does not have to be considered as synonymous of acculturation. Most of all, it does not imply assimilation and abandonment of one's cultural background. Different practices and strategies of cultural adaptation and/or maintenance of cultural heritage can take place, as showed by survey and qualitative in-depth research studies. In this context, integration as *positive interaction* will consist in having, at the same time, a positive and continuous interchange between natives and foreign immigrants on the one hand, and between different foreign groups on the other.

  As a consequence, **indicators of direct and indirect discrimination in social relations** should be further developed, since discrimination is likely to deteriorate immigrants/nationals relations and impede immigrants' access to rights. Indicators of discriminatory attitudes and perceptions could be assessed through survey research, even though the "social desirability effect" represents a limit for the quality of the data. Indicators focusing on patterns of behaviours rather than on attitudes appear to be necessary.

  This might be the case of well designed **social contacts indicators**, that should be aimed at assessing who gets in touch with who and for what reason. At this end, in-depth, qualitative research is likely to give more reliable data, even though on a smaller scale than survey research based on questionnaires like the European Households Panel mentioned above. However, if the purpose is that of shedding new light on a so far poorly investigated aspect of immigrant integration, i.e. reciprocal immigrants/natives relations, qualitative investigation may help to explore the field and yield new hypotheses. These might be later tested on broader samples, by applying quantitative research methods.
- *Positive impact on the whole system* has to be weighted against basic requirements of *immigrants' integrity* and *positive interaction*. This has been acknowledged also in the economic and demographic literature, that emphasises more and more the necessity of looking at immigration as a factor promoting a change of the overall social structure.

  Since the contribution of immigrants to the maintenance of actual pension schemes and to the balance of fertility rates is likely to erode in the long run, *positive impact on the whole system* has to be measured by having in mind a broader perspective, looking primarily at issues of **social cohesion**. Following the OECD (2001), two are the main dimensions of social cohesion: the **reduction of social disparities**, i.e. of social exclusion; the **strength of social networks**, i.e. social capital.

As for the first dimension, a crucial indicator which might help to have an idea of the impact of immigration on the overall social system, is the **number of social protest events**, i.e. strikes and/or riots promoted by immigrant groups and/or citizens of foreign origins. These events can be regarded as potential challenges to social cohesion, which signal failures in integration policies, and thus the need for a new social pact. At the same time, on the part of the host society, the number of **overtly racist protest events and attacks**, may signal risks of social distress and rejection of immigrants.

As for social networks, **social participation indicators** appear to be of the utmost relevance, such as rates of participation in associations and foreign citizens/ minority groups political turnout. Of course, this latter can be measured only insofar as immigrants and/or citizens of immigrant origin are admitted to take part in national and/or local elections. More than signalling positive interaction, social participation indicators represent a proxy for measuring immigrants' impact on social cohesion, since they tell us to what extent immigrants participate in the society and thus contribute to its social wellbeing.

Yet, as mentioned above, ethnic organisation often represent a problematic point, since these might plead for separation rather than integration. **Indicators of immigrant associations** impact might be developed in order to find out if immigrant organisations act as isolated entities or as part of broad networks encompassing other community organisations as well as native citizens associations. At this regard, the use of quantitative network analysis has already yield interesting results on the relevance and structural completeness of ethnic networks in European cities[26].

Thus, integration as preservation of *immigrants integrity*, *positive interaction* and *positive impact* can be assessed through a battery of indicators comprising traditional economic and social indicators as well as more innovative indicators on issues such as differential/discriminatory behaviours, social contacts and social cohesion. Such a proposal does not pretend to be exhaustive or definitive. Yet, it might be regarded as a possible starting point for reflecting on new conceptualisations of integration, looking at this concept more as a multidimensional process rather than as the supposed goal of a number of fixed and stereotyped policy models.

[26] On this point see: Jacobs and Tillie 2004.

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